Asiana 777 crash: Initial thoughts from those in the field

So, I have friends who are pretty up-and-up when it comes to the airline business, and I get some pretty interesting commentary from them. In this case, concerning the Asiana crash of a Boeing 777 at SFO:

From Dutch and Micro:

…Here is the deal guys. He was on an IOE. Initial operating experience. The way we train is you get your FAA type rating the simulator, you never touch the real airplane. After you leave simulator training they put you in the real airplane, with passengers, with a Line Check Airman, a Captain with a minimum of 300 hours in type who has been observed by the national authority (FAA inspector) acting as a LCA. The LCA is the PIC despite the fact he may occupy the right seat. It is the LCA’s job to keep the operation straight. In this case, the LCA should have first suggested flight path adjustment, if not satisfactory, then he should have took control of the airplane before things got out of hand.

Rustydog depends on the 747 model. From a 747-200 to a 777, yeah big difference. From a -400 to a 777 not so much.

By the way, I found out the PAPI had not been moved to reflect the new threshold point. BFU by SFO. I also found out the nav data base in the FMS did not reflect the new threshold. Two FU’s over which the pilot’s had no control. Now you add the traditional SFO slam dunk approach, an IOE going on, the crew being controlled by a second language, from controller’s talking a mile a minute. I can see some chaos there and things getting out of hand real fast. My guess is no one is going to get out of this with clean hands. SFO airport, the FAA for approving construction out of the data base cycle, Asiana for scheduling an IOE into this airport, Asiana Flight Standards for subpar LCA performance. I suspect the citizens of San Francisco are going to be throwing in some coin on the settlements.

And then we have an email from a United crewmember holding short of of the runway as the Asiana flight approached:

On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn’t appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500′ away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger’s needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors’ parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we’d tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300′ away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain Jim Abel met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain Herlihy and F/O Ishikawa went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay.

Really, some pretty incredible stuff coming from people who have been properly trained and know what is going on in the industry.